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RECENT DECISIONS
based its denial of compensation on the fact that the taken parcel had
... no specifically demonstrative and directly effective utilization
or function." 24 The Court reasoned that the depreciating injury to
the remainder was, in a legal sense, only a consequence of the prox-
imity of the air base generally, and not a result of the use to which
the taken tract was put. Under the facts in the instant case, such a
finding appears unrealistic. There is no doubt that land may be
utilized without constructing or depositing something on its surface. 25
An air base could not well serve its purpose unless there were open
lands surrounding it to permit planes to approach the runway proper
and to provide a buffer zone for planes disabled on takeoff or landing.
Viewed in this light, the land taken from the appellants was put to a
"specific use."
The Court suggested that the complainants may have a future
cause of action for damages resulting from the operation of the air
base. Compensation for the present taking, however, is in no way
affected by the existence of this possible future action; the action could
be brought irrespective of whether there had been a prior taking.2 6
In order completely to indemnify the appellants, they must be returned
to the position they occupied before a portion of their property was
condemned. That, it is submitted, cannot be done without compensat-
ing them for the damages sustained because of the use of the taken
land as part of an air base.
EQUITY - CONSTRUCTION LOAN AGREEMENTS SPECIFICALLY
ENFORCEALE.-Plaintiff-borrower sued for specific performance of
a construction loan agreement. The plaintiff failed to allege inade-
quacy of remedy at law. The Court, denying a motion to dismiss the
complaint, held that construction loan agreements are specifically en-
forceable and are exceptions to the rule that equity will refuse to
exercise jurisdiction to enforce loan contracts because of adequacy of
remedy at law. Southampton Wholesale Food Terminal, Inc. v.
Providence Warehouse Co., 129 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1955).
Equity developed as an extraordinary medium for granting re-
lief which was otherwise unavailable to aggrieved parties because of
the rigid and formalistic character of actions at law.1 Because of its
24 Boyd v. United States, 222 F2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1955).
25 See Cormack, Legal Concepts In Cases Of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J.
221 (1931).26 See, e.g., Causby v. United States, 109 Ct. C1. 768, 75 F. Supp. 262 (1948).
2 See CLAUR, EQuIY § 5 (1954); RF, SELFCTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY xi
(1955).
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supplementary nature, the equitable remedy of specific performance
has been granted only where actions at law proved inadequate.
2
However, this prerequisite to equity jurisdiction has undergone some
modification with respect to ordinary chattels through the extensive
adoption of the Uniform Sales Act.3 Section 68 permits a buyer to
obtain specific performance of a contract to sell goods if the court
"thinks fit." While some jurisdictions have viewed this provision
as a statutory liberalization of the doctrine,4 others regard it as a
mere codification of the common law. 5 The Uniform Commercial
Code also proposes a more liberal exercise of discretion in determin-
ing whether or not chattel sales contracts will be specifically enforced.6
Recently, the Massachusetts Legislature provided that specific perfor-
mance is not barred by an available remedy at law if that remedy is
not ". . . the equivalent of the performance promised by the con-
tract ..... , Despite such modifications, the doctrine of inadequacy
of remedy remains substantially intact in both federal s and state 0
courts.
Since an action at law for breach of a loan contract is adequate,' 0
equity will not, as a general rule, specifically enforce such agree-
ments." However, construction loan contracts have been specifically
enforced in at least two jurisdictions. In Columbus Club v. Simons 12
the mortgagee refused to tender the amount of the mortgage after
having obtained a defeasible title to the property. The court reasoned
that the facts were analogous to a contract for the sale of land with
payment as the sole executory obligation, a circumstance clearly war-
2 Wirth & Hamid Fair Booking, Inc. v. Wirth, 265 N.Y. 214, 222, 192 N.E.
297, 301 (1934) (dictum); see Buzard v. Houston, 119 U.S. 347 (1886);
Trainor v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 131 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1942).
3 See 1A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED Table III (Supp. 1954) (The act
has been adopted by thirty-three state legislatures.).
4 See, e.g., Hunt Foods, Inc. v. O'Disho, 98 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Cal. 1951);
Pittinger Equipment Co. v. Timber Structures Inc., 189 Ore. 1, 217 P.2d 770
(1950).
5 See, e.g., Glick v. Beer, 263 App. Div. 599, 33 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1st Dep't
1942) ; McCallister v. Patton, 214 Ark. 293, 215 S.W.2d 701 (1948).
6 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716, comment 1 (1952).
7 MAss. LAWS ANN. c. 214, § 1A (1955).
8 See, e.g., Jamison Coal & Coke Co. v. Goltra, 143 F.2d 889 (8th Cir.
1944) ; Trainor v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 131 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1942).
9 See, e.g., Lee Builders, Inc. v. Wells, 95 A.2d 692 (Del. Ch.), rev'd on
other grounds, 99 A.2d 620 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1953) ; Wagner v. Savage, 195 Ore.
128, 244 P.2d 161 (1952).
10 Hjxson v. First Nat'l Bank, 198 Iowa 942, 200 N.W. 710, 711 (1924)
(dictum); Norwood v. Crowder, 177 N.C. 469, 99 S.E. 345, 346 (1919)
(dictum) ; see Leach v. Fuller, 65 Colo. 68, 173 Pac. 427 (1918).
"1 Conklin v. People's Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 41 N.J. Eq. 20, 2 Atl. 615 (Ch.
1886); Sickel v. Mosenthal, 30 Beav. 371, 54 Eng. Rep. 932 (Rolls 1862);
Bradford, E. & C.R.R. v. New York, L.E. & W.R.R., 123 N.Y. 316, 327,
25 N.E. 499, 501 (1890) (dictum).
12 110 Okla. 48, 236 Pac. 12 (1925).
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ranting specific performance.' 3 A New Jersey equity court decreed
specific performance of a loan agreement where the mortgagor had
so changed his position as to render inadequate a remedy at law.' 4
In reliance on these two cases, it was held in City of Camden v. South
Jersey Port Commission 15 that when specific performance presents
the only possible medium of relief, it may be utilized to enforce a
loan agreement.
In the instant case, no importance was attached to the plaintiff's
failure to allege inadequacy in his complaint. The Court merely re-
stated the general rule requiring inadequacy and indicated its aware-
ness of the absence of such an allegation.. The law of Massachusetts,
which was apparently controlling in the principal case,' 6 does not
permit of such facile treatment. There is no indication in the reported
cases of that state that inadequacy of remedy at law is not pre-
requisite to equity jurisdiction. Similarly, the Massachusetts statute
which permits specific performance where the remedy at law is not
equivalent to the promised performance, seems merely to codify the
existing law "[w]ithout broadening the jurisdiction of equity what-
soever... ," 17 Moreover, the Court did not consider this statute in
arriving at its determination. The Court cited only two cases to sup-
port its position that construction loan agreements, as such, are ex-
ceptions to the general rule. Actually, these cases merely demonstrate
that such agreements will be specifically enforced under special cir-
cumstances which have been traditional bases for equity jurisdiction.-8
Specific performance will be denied construction mortgages absent
such special conditions.' 9 In both cases, the fact that construction
loan agreements were involved was in no way controlling.
The instant case seems to represent a departure from the well
established rule that equity will not decree specific performance if
13 See Greene v. Marshall, 108 F.2d 717 (1st Cir. 1940) ; Merten v. Fertig,
281 Fed. 908 (8th Cir. 1922) ; Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Simon, 66 N.Y.S.2d
806 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
14 Jacobson v. First Nat'l Bank, 129 N.J. Eq. 440, 20 A.2d 19 (Ch. 1941),
aff'd Per curiam, 130 N.J. Eq. 604, 23 A.2d 409 (Ct of Err. & App. 1942).
15 4 N.J. 357, 73 A.2d 55 (1950).
1The substantive law of the forum governs in diversity of citizenship cases.
National Fruit Product Co. v. Divinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 503 (1942)
(dictum); see Erie R.RL v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRAcTicE 334 (2d ed. 1948); Note, 55 YALE L.J. 401, 420 (1946).
17 Note, 35 B.U.L. REv. 122, 139 (1955). Previous to the adoption of the
statute, equity would not assume jurisdiction if an adequate remedy at law were
available. See, e.g., Maguire v. Reough, 238 Mass. 98, 130 N.E. 270 (1921).
The statute has not yet been construed.
1s See Columbus Club v. Simons, 110 Okla. 48, 236 Pac. 12 (1925) (mortgage
contract specifically enforceable because analogous to a land sale contract);
Jacobson v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 14 (specific performance because of
complainant's change of position).
'9 See, e.g., Conklin v. People's Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 41 N.J. Eq. 20, 2 Atl.
615 (Ch. 1886); Western Wagon & Property Co. v. West, [1892] 1 Ch. 271
(senbie).
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there is an adequate remedy at law. However, the extreme brevity
of the opinion inhibits a clear understanding of the rationale. The
Court mentions that a contract to sell land is specifically enforceable
"though the defendant's sole obligation is to pay money." If this
allusion was intended to justify the decision on the ground that a
construction loan agreement is analogous to a contract to sell land,
then perhaps the decision may be regarded, not as a startling de-
parture from precedent, but as adopting the view taken in the
Columbus case.
A
INSURANCE - STATUTE OF FRAUDS No DEFENSE TO PARTY
FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINING POLICY FROM ORAL AsSIGNEE.-The
insured's widow claimed the proceeds of a life policy in which her
sister-in-law, the defendant, was noted as beneficiary. The plaintiff-
widow asserted that her deceased husband orally assigned and de-
livered the policy to her, at which time she was the named beneficiary,
and that she thereafter made substantially all premium payments.
She further alleged that the decedent secretly removed the policy from
her possession, changed the beneficiary, and gave it to the defendant
with whom he had conspired. The defendant contended that the
oral assignment was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The
Court held that the plaintiff would be entitled to the proceeds of the
policy if the allegations were proven. Katzman v. -,ta Life Ins.
Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d 307 (1955).
An insurance policy is a chose in action.1 Before the enactment
of Section 31, subdivision 9, of the Personal Property Law,2 it was
well settled in New York that a policy was orally assignable.3 In
most other jurisdictions such an assignment is still recognized.4 For
I Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 158 N.Y. 24, 52 N.E. 662 (1899); Matter of
Pastore, 155 Misc. 247, 279 N.Y. Supp. 200 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
2 "Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note
or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or
undertaking;
"9. Is a contract to assign or an assignment, with or without considera-
tion to the promisor, of a life or health or accident insurance policy, or a
promise, with or without consideration to the promisor, to name a beneficiary
of any such policy. This provision shall not apply to a policy of industrial
life or health or accident insurance." N.Y. PEns. Psop. LAW § 31(9) (effective
March 11, 1943).
3 Marcus v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 68 N.Y. 625 (1877); McGlynn
v. Curry, 82 App. Div. 431, 81 N.Y. Supp. 855 (2d Dep't 1903).
4 See Loth, Gifts of Life Insurance, [1945] INs. L.J. 515, 517; 25 Miss. L.J.
72 (1953). Contra, Steele v. Gatlin, 115 Ga. 929, 42 S.E. 253 (1902).
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